Control the Chemical or Control the Narrative? What did Industry learn from 3M’s $10 Billion Loss?
Photo by Carl Bohacek (C)
On June 22, the New York Times reported that 3M had reached a $10-12.5 billion settlement in the largest drinking water multi-district litigation in US history. The settlement came nearly 3 weeks after the scheduled start of the first bellwether trial for PFAS contamination of municipal water supplies. Given that 3M stock price rose 4% in after hours trading following the announcement late on June 22, it seems many believe that 3M “won” the settlement. More cautious voices point to multiple other, still pending, areas of PFAS litigation, in the US and globally. Notable in the settlement is that 3M did not admit any liability.
While this settlement isnt the end of the PFAS debacle for many communities, it offers a opportunity for reflection. What has the chemical industry learned so far from the global PFAS contamination and subsequent litigation? As corporations consider the 3M settlement, does it motivate them to work harder to control their chemicals or rather, to work harder to control the narrative around their chemicals?
Documents made public via the 2018 3M settlement with the State of Minnesota over PFAS contamination in the eastern Twin Cities indicate that 3M knew that PFOS was in the blood of the general population as early as 1975. In 3M documents produced during this time, it seems 3M suspected that products such as food packaging and carpet protection were likely potential sources of the contamination in the general public. 3M also seemed to understand that having uncontrolled exposure to a compound that is both virtually indestructible and that accumulates in humans could have significant implications for human health. Despite direct inquiries from academic researchers outside of 3M who postulated widespread contamination of an industrial organic fluorochemical in the mid-1970s and 1980s, no information on PFOS was shared publicly.
Even suspecting that they were likely responsible for large scale contamination of the human population, not only did 3M do little to control exposure to their chemicals, they ramped up manufacturing, increasing PFOS-based production five fold between 1975 and 1989, primarily to support coatings used in direct contact with food. Between 1989-1999, high production levels were stable, a manufacturing trend that 3M scientists corroborated by reflecting on the levels of PFOS in the blood of the general population during this same period, which followed the same trend.
In the years between 1975-2000, although 3M took few actions to control the chemical they knew was widespread in the human population, they were proactive in controlling the narrative surrounding PFOS contamination, actions that allowed them to delay major legal consequences for at least 25 years.
Although 3M scientists engaged in an on-going dialogue with academic researchers about the identity of the organic fluorine in the blood of the general population, they never revealed the name or structure of the compound they knew (or at the very least, highly suspected) was at the center of the inquiry. Beyond their misleading exchanges with academic research outside of 3M, 3M scientists used the peer-reviewed technical literature to deflect speculation away from industrial fluorochemicals as a source for the contamination and infer a “naturally occurring organic fluorine” instead.
During this period of engagement , 3M protected the chemical details associated with the product line that represented one of the largest suspected sources of human exposure to PFOS as confidential business information. Absent that identifying data, academic researchers outside of 3M struggled to make progress on their investigation. Without product-specific information from 3M, for the academic researchers, it was like searching for an unnamed ingredient in a grocery store. Not surprisingly, those researchers failed to confirm the identity or source of the “unknown”organic fluorochemical. Peer reviewed technical publications on the topic trickled off. Narrative controlled.
In 1998, amidst new and copious data demonstrating that PFOS was widespread in the human public and in the environment, 3M shared details about PFOS contamination with the EPA via a TSCA 8(e) submission. In 2000, they shared some information, including the identity of the organic fluorine compound, PFOS, with the public in announcing their decision to exit the C8 PFAS business. Still working to control the narrative, with that announcement, 3M rolled out years of data collected from their own workers stating that, according to their data, PFOS was not toxic at the levels found in the environment or in humans.
As they did in the 1970s/80s, during the early 2000s, 3M tried to influence scientific discussion in the peer-reviewed technical literature. In the years following 3M’s PFOS disclosure to the general public, they paid a well placed reviewer to screen studies damaging to 3M, thereby controlling the scientific discourse from the “outside”. Some have speculated that 3M paid over a million dollars for the reviewer to exert his influence.
The practice of controlling the data so you can control the dialogue is not new to American industries. The practice is well documented by heavy hitters such as RJ Reynolds (cigarettes and lung cancer), Exxon (fossil fuels and climate change) and J&J (asbestos and ovarian cancer).
Will 3M’s $10 billion fine change how industry develops products or only remind them of how critical it is to develop propaganda, controlling the narrative so you dont have to control the chemical?
